

TRANSNISTRIAN DIGEST


A weekly digest of the English and Russian-language analyses and commentaries on the Transnistrian conflict

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1. **Adrian Jacobovits de Szeged: "It is Dificult to Work in Transnistria, but that Does not Mean that one Should not Try to do More"**
2. **Secession by Referendum? Chris Borgen. www.opiniojuris.org**
3. **Our Failure in Europe's East. Bruce Jackson. Washington Post. 09.10.2006**
4. **5+1 Consultations in Odessa to Focus on Negotiation Resumption. OSCE Mission to Moldova News Digest. 12.10.2006.**
5. **Russia Splits up GUAM. Kommersant.com 11.10.2006**
6. **What Rule Does the Exception Prove? Kommersant.com 11.10.2006**
7. **Peacemaking Mythology. Azi.md 04.10.2006**
8. **Trans-Dniester: Longing for Russian Hug, Breakaway Region Feels the Pinch of Isolation. Worldstream. 29.09.2006**
9. **'The Expansion Process Has Begun'. The Weekly Standard. 10.10.2006**
10. **Молдавия Возвращается в Клуб Друзей России. Независимая Газета. 12.10.2006**
11. **Просьба о Признании. Strana.ru 12.10.2006**
12. **Приднестровье Готовится к Выборам. Strana.ru. 12.10.2006**
13. **Виталий Кулик: «Украину вытеснили из Приднестровья». Iamik.ru 11.10.2006**
14. **Сепаратизм в Молдове: Мнения Экспертов. Iamik.ru 05.10.2006**
15. **Хорошего Понемногу. Vremea.net 11.10.2006**
16. **Григорий Карасин: «Референдум Придал Больше Уверенности Населению и Лидерам Приднестровья в том, что Они На Правильном Пути». Ольвия-Пресс. 11.10.2006**

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1. **Adrian Jacobovits de Szeged: "It is Dificult to Work in Transnistria, but that Does not Mean that one Should not Try to do More"**



Remarks by Ambassador Adrian Jacobovits de Szeged, EU Special Representative for Moldova at the international conference "Roads towards democratisation of the Transnistrian region" (Chisinau, 27 September 2006).

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Indeed, you were right to give a good "thank you" to the Czech Republic, which has brought together such a numerous and interesting gathering today after they had already organized a very successful Conference on Democratization in Transnistria in Brussels [in November 2005]. I really applaud this initiative of one of the member states, which bodes well for further activities. As we have such a numerous crowd here, I am looking very much forward for the discussion, because you are here not only to listen, but also to participate in the discussions. What I hope we can do on this side of the table is to be as brief as possible. So, I will have some brief remarks to give more opportunity for discussions, and I am very much looking forward to that.

I have been asked to speak on two subjects: on the democratisation of Transnistria and on recent developments in the settlement process of the Transnistrian issue. And that's what I will do and I'll do it in a reverse order: because I suggest that we look first at developments, and then look at the democratisation.

It is clear to all of us that the two are very intimately linked as indeed it was mentioned in the Yushchenko document, which you've just referred to.

Now, in the recent developments there are, as so often, good things and bad things, and also, as so often, we should start looking at the good things first. The good thing, the *major* good thing, is that we have now *one* agreed customs regime on the Moldovan-Ukrainian border agreed to by both Governments. It is clear that when you have two regimes on one border this is the ideal situation for smugglers to do their business. And we, in the European Union looking ahead when Moldova will be a neighbor of the European Union - it looks now as from January 1, 2007 - are extremely interested in having order at the border of our neighbors. The EU Border Assistance Mission is doing a very good job there, in training their counterparts, in giving better modern equipment and training them how to use that equipment, and of course in monitoring the border and seeing what's going on there, and also seeing that a lot of what is going on there shouldn't be going on. That is very useful. If you wish we can go into details but this is not the subject of this seminar.

So, that is a good thing. It is also a good thing that all firms in Transnistria that are interested in foreign trade have now registered in Chisinau and therefore can act and have their contacts in foreign trade in a legal way. That is, of course, important for an orderly international system and I am glad that the system is working and that looks very good. So, that is the good thing.

There are also other good things, like the fact that now for once the farmers in the area of Dorotskoye could indeed sow and harvest their crops. It is also a good thing that we see that the Moldovan language schools in Transnistria, with the Latin script, have started working again, teaching again this year. These are good signs for the future. But all the problems have been solved on these issues, but the main ones have, I feel. So, that is the good side.

The bad development I would think is the fact that we have seen a very overt move of the Transnistrian authorities towards independence. I am, of course, referring to the referendum and that is, as we all know, not the first referendum. And frankly, whether we have three, four, five, six or seven referenda on independence that does not make that much of a difference. But it is, of course, an unfortunate move because it is a move away from reintegration of the country. We can, and we will, of course, not recognize this referendum and nobody will. So, the effect of this seems to me to be rather minimal. But it is an unfortunate thing because it shows the direction of authorities which should not be the direction.

If you look at the first question, of course, it is a *contradictio in terminis*, as our Latin forebears would say. From one side if you vote for independence of Transnistria you are also voting for unification with Russia and therefore for losing your independence. These sort of improbable questions were put to the electorate there, and it is also clear that there are no provisions at present there for having free and democratic election. There is no freedom of the media, there is harassment of people who like to vote differently from what the authorities want them to vote, and we are confronting a part of the country which is under, well, let's put it in a sort of neutral way, a very authoritarian rule.



But I think, on the positive side is that there are forces also in that part of Moldova that realise that you cannot exist in Europe without having a democracy, and I think we should further that. Even those people who would like independence realise that you will never have a recognised independence without having a democratic system in Europe. I think, therefore, there is a great task for us to promote democratisation of Transnistria.

Now, I have come to the second aspect, but before I get into that, I would like to say that on the negative side of the settlement process I also think that the fact that we have had no negotiations in the 5+2 framework since February is a negative side, and you know that we haven't had them because the Transnistrian side has refused to come. It has refused to come and under those circumstances the Russians

have thought then it hasn't had much sense to come. But that is obviously up to Moscow. I think this will be changing soon. After all the blockade, which Smirnov has imposed on his own people after the 3rd of March when a new customs regime was put in force, has now all been lifted, foreign trade is going as it should go, impediments are away and, therefore, I think there is no reason anymore not to get together. So, I would hope that we can get together again next month, in October, because everyone realises that you can only solve a problem by negotiations. And, how Mr. Lupu very rightly said, that is the only way - by peaceful means and by negotiations. So, we have to get together and everyone will understand that.

Now, on democratization. Mr. Chairman, these two are indeed very closely linked. Because I do feel, I think with Ukrainian president, that the negotiations that have eventually to take place between Transnistrian representatives and representatives from Chisinau on the status of Transnistria in a reunited country have to be done by democratically elected people. Therefore, I think this democratisation, only therefore is already very important. But there are few more issues on this, and I think the international community has a big role in this and should start looking into ways to foster preconditions of democratization. The development of an active civil society in Transnistria and the strengthening of cooperation ties between civil society organisations on this side and on the other side of the Dniestr play a crucial role in providing the backbone of such a process.

As we probably all know there are quite a number of non-governmental organisations in Transnistria. According to the statistics there are more than 600. Now we know that the majority of those are either dormant or are under tight governmental control. But there is still the civil society at work in Transnistria often subject to pressure and harassment by the *de facto* authorities, nevertheless, individuals involved in that have gone through difficult experiences but are pursuing their way towards democratization of Transnistria. Here, I feel, if you look at the priorities, which we should discuss today and which look promising for that part of the country, there are essentially three activities. And in those three activities there is both work to be done for the international community - and it this particularly case for the EU and its member states, and for Moldova, on the other side.

The first is bringing people together. It is clear that there is a sense of alienation from Chisinau in Transnistria fueled through mistrust and lack of information. And that mistrust and lack of information have been artificially promoted in Transnistria during these 16 years of separation. This has resulted, I feel, in a growing and potentially critical divergence between the two parts of the country. The generation of young Transnistrians is growing up, and has grown up, misinformed and wary and used to see Chisinau as "they", not as "us". And that is a bad thing, and therefore as a response to that tendency I think the activities that bring people together, from both sides of the divide, should be promoted to bridge the gap, and particularly facilitate cross border movement, people to people contact, strengthen direct links between the civil society of the two sides and guarantee media freedoms. We have seen some good examples yesterday of this conference, which has been taken place here. We have also seen very interesting seminar the other week organized by the Moldovan Foreign Policy Association. Those are activities that are very worthwhile and should be strengthened and therefore the Czech Republic is doing such a good job. That is one thing.

On the other hand we have *to promote grass roots organisations* as an inevitable foundation of a democratic society in Transnistria, and that is also the learning ground for a pluralistic and participatory democracy.

Thirdly, media freedom is another thorny issue. We see that research conducted both in Moldova and on the Transnistrian side of the river shows that the two regions are still characterized by lack of total media freedom and that is, of course, much worse in Transnistria than it is on this side of the river. There, on the other side, you have radio and TV under the authorities' tight control and opposition voices in Transnistria are relegated to the printed media. Unfortunately, there are those printed media, but this printed media have a lot of difficulties, they face a lack of resources and that makes it difficult to buy even relatively inexpensive equipment. And you have unfair competition from the authorities, which dump on the market heavily subsidised and cheap papers.

Looking at the way ahead there is also work to be done for Moldova on these three issues. In particular, I think that it is a common place, may be to hear, that Moldova should make itself attractive to the

Transnistrian population. Nevertheless, that is crucial, and I am thinking then in terms of protection of human rights, reliability of the judiciary system, political pluralism and freedom of the media. There Chisinau should give an example and that is very important and that means that they should indeed fulfill the EU-Moldova Action Plan in detail. And in that part of fulfilling the Action Plan regarding the civil society, EU and the member states should be more directly involved in civil society development projects.

It is often argued that it is difficult to work in Transnistria. Yes it is difficult. But that does not mean that one should not try and one should not start to do it. We have seen that in Transnistria those NGOs that are working in the social and humanitarian fields have more facilities than those who are, for obvious reasons, moving more into political areas. But even in those first fields, in the social and humanitarian fields, there is a lot to do and if Transnistrian NGOs can be active in that field they should be actively supported, because in that way too we can promote, in the end, a pluralistic and democratic society.

So, bringing my remarks to a close, Mr. Chairman, and looking forward to the discussion, I would resume those three points: bring people together, fill the information gap and do more from the European Union and from the member states on this score. And on this I hope my colleague [next speaker, Raul de Luzenberger, Moldova Desk Officer, DG External Relations, European Commission] would have to say a lot. Thank you.

Transcript by APE (G.S.).

2. Secession by Referendum? Chris Borgen. www.opiniojuris.org

Last month I wrote a series of posts, chained below, concerning the separatist conflict in Moldova. At issue is who should control Transnistria, a strip of land between the Dniestr River and the border of Ukraine. Transnistria contains Moldova's key industrial infrastructure, power plants, and, importantly, a significant stockpile of Soviet-era arms. Since 1992, it has been under the effective control of a separatist regime that calls itself the Transnistrian Moldovan Republic ("TMR"). I was part of a mission sent by the New York City Bar to assess the legal issues and I drafted the mission's report. Today the Transnistrians go to the polls to vote on a referendum concerning whether they want the TMR to be a separate country. The referendum was organized by the separatist leaders and only those in the separatist enclave may vote. Consider the somewhat surreal scene in Transnistria today, as described by the International Herald Tribune: People began trickling in early Sunday to the 262 voting stations as loudspeakers throughout the center of the main city, Tiraspol, blared Soviet-era music and reminders to vote. They stood patiently behind registration tables set up by street - Lenin Street, Marx Street - and many clutched now- useless Soviet passports.

At first blush this might seem like a "wave of democracy" ballots-over-bullets scenario. Nothing could be further from the truth. The Transnistrian referendum is an example of how blatantly illegal regimes have learned to use the tropes of international law to cloak themselves with a mantle of respectability. The drive for a referendum was emboldened in recent months by Montenegro's achieving sovereignty via referendum, the belief that Kosovo will also achieve independence, and also, possibly, by Russian support for the Transnistrian referendum process (the exact Russian stance is unclear and the U.S. has sought a clear statement from Moscow if they would recognize such a referendum). The Transnistrian referendum itself is being closely watched by South Ossetia, a breakaway region in the former Soviet republic of Georgia, which has also scheduled its own referendum for independence. Abkhazia (also in Georgia) and Nagorno-Karabakh (in Azerbaijan) are other "frozen conflicts" with an interest in the outcome of today's vote. Are we entering a new era of secession and sovereignty via referendum?

The referendum itself more-or-less clues in the voter on the point of this exercise. As summarized by the US ambassador to the OSCE, there are two questions on today's ballot: The first asks if voters "support the course of independence" for Transnistria and then "joining" the Russian Federation. The second asks if citizens favor "rejection of the independence" of Transnistria and subsequent reunification with Moldova. In sum: independence through unification with Russia or loss of independence through "reunification" with Moldova.

This is nothing new, the Transnistrian leadership has used questionable referenda in 1990 and 1994 in attempts to seem legitimate. Now they argue that, besides legitimacy, a referendum showing that the population was in favor of independence would be legally binding. In October 2004, the so-called President of the TMR, Igor Smirnov, said We must hold a national referendum, with international observers to make sure that there can be no doubt about the legitimacy of our state. The results of the referendum will be a law for us, a law that the international community, above all the United States, the European Union and the OSCE, will have to respect.

It is Time to Separate Good Law from Bad Analogies.

Bad Analogy #1: The situation in Transnistria is like that in Montenegro. The key fact regarding the Montenegrin referendum was that Serbia accepted the use of a referendum as a means to resolve the issue. The government of Moldova does not. As a matter of law, the central government (absent some tother circumstances such as serious human rights abuses) gets to decide. Quite simply, that is what sovereignty is all about. As far back as the 1920's, the Aaland Islands Commission weighed the ability of the ethnically Swedish Aaland Islanders to secede from Finland. The Commission found that the ability to choose fate by plebiscite must be decided by the state itself (in that case, Finland); otherwise such a formulation would infringe on the sovereign right of states. To say that a separatist regime can merely vote itself into independence would set so low a bar that the Westphalian system would devolve into a thousand microstates of nature. This is good law and it makes good sense.

Bad Analogy #2: If Kosovo gets independence, so should Transnistria. Kosovo is a special case, the result of the dissolution of a state (Yugoslavia) the general breakdown of a region, and the bad acts of the central government (Serbia). The international administration of Kosovo, due to the humanitarian disaster that was being caused by the central government is also of crucial importance. None of these factors apply in Moldova. Amidst all the rhetoric about referenda, self-determination, and sovereignty, one should keep a few things in mind.

Reality Check #1: The result of the vote will likely be in favor of independence and unification with Russia. The fix is in. Referenda are a tool that the TMR's leadership likes to use. They like to refer to the 1990 referendum in Transnistria that reportedly had 96% of the voters favoring autonomy and, if necessary, the future creation of an independent state. While there is likely some support in Transnistria for independence, the votes that occurred must be considered with a critical eye. In a visit to Tiraspol in September 1992, political scientist Pal Kolst? was shown lists in which the votes of the residents had been recorded with their names, causing him to conclude "the anonymity of the voters had been compromised." How free and fair is an election when the (so-called) government gets to check on how you voted?

Reality Check #2: A pro-independence vote will not change the views of most key countries and international organizations. In an interview with Radio Free Europe, the head of the OSCE mission to Moldova, Louis O'Neill said The OSCE will not recognize this referendum, and we have no intention to support or observe a unilateral action, which calls into question the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the Republic of Moldova... Particularly when you consider the suggestive character of the questions, which are themselves compound questions, each one of them contains two parts, so there really should be four questions, and that they pretty much imply the desired answer. The EU has made a similar statement, as reported by Radio Free Europe: Emma Udwin, spokeswoman to the EU external relations commissioner Benita Ferrero-Waldner, said the referendum will not change the status quo.

"We don't recognize Transdniester as a state, we don't recognize Transdniester's independence and there is no country that does," Udwin said. "This referendum, which will be held doesn't alter any part of that state of affairs. It will not be recognized by the EU, we understand that it will not be recognized by the OSCE, and therefore it is not something that will have international validity." The US also rejects the validity of the referendum. See here. So not only is the referendum not legally binding, it is not even persuasive. But...

Reality Check #3: Russia is the wild card. Here's how Radio Free Europe put it: So far, Russia has not said whether it will recognize the results of the poll. The Russian Foreign Ministry today issued a statement saying that referendums were "seen in recognized democratic states as an important legal basis

for building civil society." However, some Russian officials have spoken in favor of recognizing the Transdniester referendum and an upcoming similar poll. On November 12, Georgia's separatist pro-Moscow region of South Ossetia is holding a referendum. Konstantin Zatulin, the director of the Institute of CIS Countries and a Duma deputy from the pro-Kremlin Unified Russia party, said Russia is generally in favor of referendums.

"Russia definitely respects the principle of referendums to decide the fate of nations and populations. In my opinion, Russia is totally prepared to recognize, under certain conditions, the independence of Transdniester from the Moldovan republic, especially since this independence has long been a fact," Zatulin said. Russia may use this referendum for political cover to support Transnistrian independence. It has tacitly supported independence for 15 years. Is this referendum actually about Russia becoming more aggressive in its "near abroad?" Note that South Ossetia and Abkhazia, the two separatist regions in Georgia that are carefully tracking this vote, are also supported by Russia. As a matter of policy, only time will tell whether this is a sign of things to come. As a matter of law, there's nothing here.

<http://www.opiniojuris.org/posts/1158533514.shtml>

3. Our Failure in Europe's East. Bruce Jackson. Washington Post. 09.10.2006

The Washington Post, Bruce P. Jackson. At Warsaw University in 2002, in what many believe to be his finest speech, President Bush advanced a vision of a free and complete Europe that would stretch "from the Baltic to the Black Sea." At the end of next month, when they gather in Riga, Latvia, on the shores of the Baltic Sea, Bush and the NATO allies will have cause to wonder what happened to their hopes for Europe's East. At the most superficial level, things never go well in Europe when the United States is preoccupied elsewhere. This was true in 1956 during the Suez crisis, when the Soviet Union invaded Hungary, and again in 1968, when the Vietnam War drowned out interest in the suppression of the Prague spring. Given NATO's difficulties in Afghanistan and the bloody frustration of the United States in Iraq, it is not surprising to see Russia bullying its way around its former empire and threatening energy-dependent Europe.

But the newly powerful Kremlin, flush with oil money, is not the real problem of Europe's East. Even truculent Turkey, which now seems lost in a strange haze of anti-Americanism, anti-Semitism and vaguely Islamist nativism, is not the problem. Turkey has been the "sick man" of Europe for at least a century, and Russia has been a threat to its neighbors far longer. What has changed is that Europe has finally reached the frontiers of its influence and has no idea what to do with its new neighbourhood. To the south of Vienna lie Croatia, Macedonia, Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia, Albania and Kosovo, which have been waiting on Europe's doorstep since the wars of Yugoslav succession ended in 1999. This year at the NATO summit the top three candidates, Albania, Croatia and Macedonia, can only hope for an honorable mention on the back pages of the summit communiqué. The rest of the Western Balkans has even less interaction with Europe. Over 70 percent of university students in Serbia have never set foot outside their country. This may not be surprising to Americans, but it is shocking on a continent as interconnected as Europe. Albanian students have given up trying to get visas to visit Italy and now spend their vacations in Libya.

Comparatively, however, the Western Balkans are the most fortunate of the countries in Europe's East. In December, when Romania enters the European Union, Europe will border Moldova, whose gross domestic product is roughly half of Haiti's. Moldova's wine, by far its most important product, is embargoed both by Russia, because of Moldova's deviationist pro-Western tendencies, and by the European Union, because of the high quality and low cost of the wine itself. In a triumph of enlightened E.U. policy and in keeping with the law of unintended consequences, Moldova's largest cash export to Europe today is sexually trafficked women. Like Moldova and the western Balkans, Ukraine also suffers from the tendency of both Washington and Brussels to isolate what they do not understand. Since the early 1990s the United States has pursued a manic-depressive policy toward the largest country in Eastern Europe -- and for that matter toward the country with the largest Jewish population remaining in Europe. At first, in the infamous "Chicken Kiev" speech, delivered by President George H.W. Bush in 1991, we advised Ukraine to remain part of the Soviet Union. We then celebrated Ukraine's independence and its common-sense president, Leonid Kuchma -- until we decided that Kuchma was an autocrat who sold radars illegally to Saddam Hussein. It turns out that this did not happen, but you get the point. The same unpredictable volatility

characterizes the ups and downs of our response to the coalition government in Kiev today. Seventeen years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the United States and Europe cannot maintain a consistent policy toward Ukraine from one day to the next.

What confounds both Europe and the United States are the complexity of post-Soviet societies and the impotence of Western institutions. But instead of combining our efforts with those of the European Union to end the isolation of Europe's East, we have allowed the fecklessness of the European Union and the impatience of U.S. policy to re-create what the Soviet Union used to call its "near abroad." In effect, a vacuum of crime, underdevelopment and squabbling political elites now stretches from the Baltic states to the northern shore of the Black Sea. This is the sad Marshall Plan of our generation. The problem of Europe's East is simply the loss of political vision in Washington and Brussels and the failure to keep the commitment to a Europe that is whole, free and at peace. One wonders: If this is the best Europe can do in its neighborhood and the best the United States can do together with Europe, what chances do we have in the Greater Middle East, where our ideas and influence count for far less than they do in Europe's unloved East? The writer is president of the Project on Transitional Democracies and the U.S. Committee on NATO. www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/10/06/AR2006100601388.html

4. 5+1 Consultations in Odessa to Focus on Negotiation Resumption. OSCE Mission to Moldova News Digest. 12.10.2006.

The sides participating in the settlement of the Transnistrian conflict will tackle in Odessa on October 17-18 only the possibility of resuming the five-plus-two negotiations. Spokesman of the OSCE Mission to Moldova **Claus Neukirch** has told journalists that initially, on 17 October, there will be held "3+2" consultations [Ukraine, Russia and the OSCE as mediators and the USA and EU as observers], which will not be attended by Chisinau and Tiraspol. "On the second day, the negotiators are due to meet Moldovan Reintegration Minister **Vasile Sova**, and later on, they will discuss with the Transdnistrian foreign minister **Valeriy Litskay**".

He noted that the package of new initiatives on settlement of the Transnistrian conflict, which the Belgian OSCE Chairmanship has recently launched, will not be discussed at the meeting. According to Neukirch, these proposals cannot be discussed as long as Chisinau and Tiraspol do not officially declare their opinions about them. Neukirch added that the OSCE Chairmanship-in-Office has worked out and launched these initiatives. The head of the Reintegration Ministry's information and analysis department, **Alexandru Flenchea**, confirmed that the Moldovan delegation has been invited to Odessa to tackle the situation created in the negotiating process and the possibility to resume them. Answering journalists' questions about what Moscow is going to undertake in what regards the possible Russia-Transnistria integration, the Russian Deputy Minister, **Grigory Karasin** said, "There exists a whole number of accords in the spheres of economy, social insurance, education and other. Today, we discussed ways of practical realization of the accords". Next week, he said, Odessa city will host two-day consultations. "We negotiated this question both in Chisinau and Tiraspol, too, and our main idea is that there may be no settlement of the Transnistria conflict without direct contacts between Chisinau and Tiraspol, and without the working out of such documents that would be acceptable to both Moldova and Transnistria", stressed Grigory Karasin.

He also said that at his meeting in Tiraspol, emphasis was put on the discussion of the Transit Protocol called to ensure Transnistria's right to free external economic activities. "We reckon this is a very important document, and we have agreed to promote its implementation. This, however, depends not only on Transnistria and Russia but on other countries as well. I am convinced that the Transit Protocol will be one of essential topics at the forthcoming Odessa consultations", said the Russian Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs. President **Igor Smirnov** stated to journalists it is impossible to resume a full-fledged negotiation process unless this document is signed, "for there may be no negotiations without a guaranty that no pressure shall ever be put on either of the sides". In his belief, the Protocol will serve the guaranty of Transnistria's independent external policy, and will exclude any possibility of repetition of the situation when Moldova "availed itself of domestic developments in Ukraine and applied economic measures to force Tiraspol to political capitulation". Answering journalists' questions about what Moscow is going to undertake in what regards the possible Russia-Transnistria integration, the Deputy Minister said, "There

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Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Defends Peacekeepers

Russian Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Grigory Karasin believes all the talks about the Russian peacekeepers' alleged inefficiency have no real grounds under them, being nothing but political speculations. Meeting on Wednesday with the command of the Russian peacekeeper contingent deployed in Transnistria, the diplomat also stated, "It is obvious that the Russian peacekeepers are being blackened, and this initiative is coming from Chisinau and Tbilissi. Their design is simple - to ouster our peacekeepers from the conflict zones of Transnistria, South Ossetia and Abkhazia. However, the peacekeeping troops carry out their mandate very accurately in Transnistria and the rest conflict regions, maintaining peace and security there - their chief mission". He further held, "One shouldn't pay attention to such talks. As for international organizations, no one of them has so far put forward any founded reproaches against our peacekeepers - and cannot put forward". Russian peacekeeping contingent commander in Transnistria Col. **Anatoly Zverev** briefed the Moscow delegation on the structure and objectives of the joint peacekeeping forces and on problems they come across here. In his words, the forces' total strength is 1,205 persons - 400 each from Russia, Transnistria and Ukraine. For comparison: in 1992, when peacekeepers were brought into the Transnistria Security Zone, the contingent was over 6 thousand men strong.

By now, Zverev said, the number of stationary peacekeeper posts has been reduced to a possible minimum - 15, against 42 in the very beginning. They have been unfolded mainly at bridges and ferry crossings as well as around Bendery town. All the men are the professional military, on service by contract here. On Wednesday, Grigory Karasin visited also the Operative Group of Russian Troops (OGRV), and met with the Transnistria leadership at night. The Moscow delegation included also Russian Federation's Representative at the Transnistrian conflict negotiations, Ambassador-at-Large Valery Nesteroushkin, Counselor-Envoy of the Russian Embassy to Moldova Oleg Astakhov, Russian Co-Chairman of the Joint Control Commission (JCC) for the Transnistrian Conflict Settlement Victor Shanin. Journalists are pointing out there was no Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to Moldova Nikolai Ryabov among officials accompanying the delegation in its trip to Chisinau and Tiraspol. The local press wrote shortly before the visit that upon Ryabov's appointment to Chisinau in 2004 the relationship between Moldova and Russia worsened sharply, and that he is going to be revoked home soon, which some publications perceived as a sign of the bilateral relations getting warmer. This "warming" was underlined yesterday by Moldovan President Vladimir Voronin, who has repeatedly stressed that "the only problem existing in the Moldo-Russian relations is the Transnistria problem", and that "there has been no cooling in our relations". (*Infotag, 12 October 2006*).

5. Russia Splits up GUAM. Kommersant.com 11.10.2006



Negotiations between the Russian and Moldovan foreign ministers took place yesterday in Moscow. Both ministers reported progress in Russian-Moldovan relations afterward. A Russian deputy foreign minister has also been sent to Chisinau. He is to find the process of unfreezing relations between the countries. Moscow is moving toward Chisinau in an effort to neutralize support in GUAM for Georgia as its standoff with that country continues. Moldovan Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister **Andrei Stratan** arrived in Moscow yesterday. He was on his way to China but, in spite of his transit plans, he was warmly greeted by Russian Foreign Minister **Sergey Lavrov**. A source in the Russian Foreign Ministry told *Kommersant* that the meeting of the minister was “informal but productive.” “They dined together and spoke about their business at the same time,” he explained. Their business was the renewal of economic cooperation and the issue of Transdnistria, which has been a sore spot in Russian-Moldovan relations since Moldova rejected a Russian settlement plan for it in 2003.

The cordial greeting the Moldovan deputy prime minister received in Moscow bears witness to improving Russian-Moldovan relations after Moldovan President Vladimir Voronin proposed reconciliation when he met with Russian President Vladimir Putin in August, after received the cold shoulder for three years.

Moscow was ready to reconcile. Last week, Russian Minister of Education and cochairman of the Russian-Moldovan intergovernmental commission **Andrey Fursenko** flew to Chisinau. Russian Deputy Foreign Minister **Grigory Karasin** also departed from Chisinau yesterday. He will be responsible for a speedy return to settlement in Transdnistria. Chisinau and Tiraspol broke off communications in March of this year after Moldova and Ukraine imposed a new customs procedure on Transdnistrian goods. Authorities in Tiraspol called the innovation an “economic blockade” and pulled out of negotiations. Now Karasin has come to make peace between them. The deputy minister is scheduled to meet with Voronin in Chisinau and then leader of the unrecognized Transdnistrian Moldovan Republic **Igor Smirnov** in Tiraspol. Transdnistrian Foreign Minister **Valeri Litskai** acknowledged for *Kommersant* that negotiations may be renewed next week. “In view of the impossibility of a full-scale dialog, Russia began shuttle diplomacy, and at a very high level. Consultations have been going on for a month and there is a proposal to meet in Odessa on October 18. We'll see what proposals Karasin brings us on that matter,” Litskai said.

Karasin has one more goal in Moldova, which may be even more important. That is settling Russian-Moldovan relations. “This visit should be seen in the context of work to remove the barriers that hinder the development of our relations,” a source in the Russian delegation told *Kommersant*. “It is time for us go from an unclear mode of communications to real cooperation. Now all the issues that have accumulated are being worked out, including economic issues. We plan to have a positive resolution to them by next month.” That source added that a meeting of the Russian-Moldovan intergovernmental commission has been scheduled for November in Moscow, at which the resumption of exports of Moldovan wine to Russia will likely be decided on.

There are rumors that the Kremlin has made another broad gesture of peace to Chisinau with the replacement of its current ambassador there, Nikolay Ryabov. Ryabov was sent to Chisinau at the height of the standoff between Chisinau and Moscow and has distinguished himself with sharp criticism of Moldovan authorities and ostentatious support for Transdnistria. Now, *Kommersant* has learned, Ryabov will not even accompany Karasin while he is in Moldova. This warming of relations comes in the midst of Russia's deteriorating relations with Georgia. In that light, reconciliation with Moldova is quite beneficial to Russia. After the Voronin regime was placed on the Kremlin's blacklist of unfriendly states three years ago, Moldova turned sharply toward the West. Voronin became noticeable friendlier with leaders of the color revolutions Viktor Yushchenko of Ukraine and Mikhail Saakashvili of Georgia and the anti-Russian rhetoric of Moldovan authorities differed little from that of the Georgian leadership. Now that the Kremlin has made several concessions to Chisinau, it may pull Moldova back into its sphere of influence.

Moscow has already received the first dividends of the thaw in relations with Chisinau. Moldova, which, along with Georgia, Ukraine and Azerbaijan, is a member of GUAM, has behaved with great pragmatism throughout the Russian-Georgian conflict. When opposition parliamentarians lobbied to adopt a statement condemning Moscow's sanctions against Tbilisi, the ruling communist party quashed it. That behavior toward its GUAM ally was due to the fact that the stakes are high for Moldova. “Agreements on practically all the sore spots in Russian-Moldovan relations are ready now for signing,” a source in the Moldovan government told *Kommersant*. “A positive solution is expected in the near future for the wine problem.

And fees for Russian gas and electricity are expected to be agreed on by November 1.” In those circumstances, Moldova has decided not to risk annoying Moscow with involvement in the Russian-Georgian conflict, all the more so that Georgia is illustrative of how Russia can respond to uncooperative neighbors. *Nikolay Filchenko. www.kommersant.com*

6. What Rule Does the Exception Prove? *Kommersant.com* 11.10.2006

The dramatic increase of diplomatic activity in the Moscow-Chisinau-Tiraspol triangle is meant to show that Russia is seriously concerned about a Transnistrian settlement and has decided to move that cause out of its dead end. But the point of Moscow's actions are not only that, and not even mainly that. Russia had plenty of opportunity to take up a Transnistrian settlement earlier. Moldovan President *Vladimir Voronin* has noticeably moderated his position toward Moscow lately and sent repeated signals of his readiness to normalize relations and solve the Transnistria problem in the process. The clearest signal was the note with a plan for normalizing relations that, according to various sources, Voronin gave Russian President *Vladimir Putin* during the Kremlin Cup horseraces in July.

But Voronin received no reaction from the Kremlin then or during his visit to Moscow in August. In September, he practically supported the referendum on independence in Transnistria. And now, less than a month later, a sudden burst of activity. The Kremlin did not lose this moment for action on the Transnistrian front by chance. It is taking place at the height of tensions between Moscow and Tbilisi for the last several years. Tbilisi is using the standoff to accuse Moscow (among other things) of not wanting to not being able to settle the Abkhazian and South Ossetian conflicts.

Those accusations are unpleasant for Moscow and could have unpleasant consequences. If the West agrees with Georgia, the issue of including Europe and the United States in the settlement of the conflicts is unavoidable, and that threatens Russia with the hated prospect of being squeezed out of the process altogether. Moscow will avoid that at any cost. That cost would be very high indeed if Russia decided on an open confrontation with the West. Therefore, that is not an attractive option for the Kremlin. Much more attractive and much cheaper is a demonstration for the world of Russia's readiness to solve conflicts in the former Soviet Union. In Abkhazia and South Ossetia, those conflicts are not unsettled because of the Kremlin's stubbornness, but because of Georgia's poor behaviour. Where a country's leadership does not argue with Moscow or call its policies “fascist,” the conflict can be resolved to the satisfaction of both sides. Take Moldova, for instance. And if the game plays out successfully for Moscow, it will have a solid argument in the West in favour of its peacekeeping efforts in the former Soviet Union. There is, of course, one “but.” By solving the Transnistrian problem so well on schedule, Moscow risks confirming one of the main contentions of its opponents, that is, that the conflicts in the CIS are not unsettled because the conditions are wrong, but because Moscow doesn't want them settled.-- *Gennady Sysoev. www.kommersant.com*

7. Peacemaking Mythology. *Azi.md* 04.10.2006

The current format of the peacemaking operation in Transnistria has become outdated from all the viewpoints. Year after year, following closely what officially is called a peacemaking operation in the Transnistrian region of the Republic of Moldova, everyone finds something special - concealed - in this obviously uncommon phenomenon. One and a half thousand of soldiers, praporshiks and officers with the most serious faces stand guard over peace, not even having a vaguest idea of who could encroach upon it. After all, the reasoning behind the documents that regulate the international peacemaking operation in the Republic of Moldova is quite simple and clear: to pull apart the conflicting parties, to create a totally demilitarized security zone, to maintain peace, law and order in the Peacemaking Force Zone of Responsibility. All these measures, according to the Agreement, are component parts of the process of conflict settlement by peaceful political means.

In March 1998, having analyzed the operation performance, the supreme leaders of participant countries introduced a number of essential modifications requiring elimination of peacemakers' obvious activity manifestation that somewhat limits the daily vital activity of the population. Particularly, Article 2 of the Odessa Agreement unambiguously stipulates to reduce, in coordination with the Joint Military Command,

the number of permanent JPF check-points, replacing them with mobile patrolling. This article assumes no other interpretation but this one. However, those who are to perform the peacemaking operation by rigorously following the provisions of only two basic documents, somehow manage to distort the contents of the articles and make up convenient interpretations, which, in the end, do not only hinder conflict settlement, but also infinitely postpone it. There is only one way out of this situation: to change the format of the peacemaking operation, bring it in line with the current situation and the main task, i.e. to contribute to peaceful conflict settlement.

About Inexactness and Liberties of Interpretation

On August 21, at a briefing held by the command of Joint Peacemaking Forces on the occasion of appointing Mr. O'Neal as the new Head of the OSCE Mission to Moldova, the speaker, Colonel **Anatoly Zverev**, senior commander of the Russian peacemaking contingent, made a number of serious inexactnesses. According to his interpretation, the 1992 peacemaking contingent counted 12,000 (twelve thousand) of staff, five battalions each from: the Russian Federation, the Republic of Moldova, and the Transnistrian region. The numbers are more than impressive and outnumber twice the real ones. 1,200 people were recruited from the Republic of Moldova and Transnistria each, which made up three, and not five, battalions, whereas the Russian Federation sent 3,800 people, which all in all made up 6,200 of staff. The Colonel could have been mistaken indeed, but another of his passages followed shortly: "currently there are no permanent check-points that could be reduced pursuant to the Odessa Agreement.

We shall remind that the purpose of these check-points is to discover and suppress transportation of weapons, ammunition, and displacement of military units not controlled by the parties. So, not a single illegally transported bullet, not a gram of explosive, not a single soldier has been uncovered at the permanent check-points within 14 years. Moreover, the absolute majority of these points are located outside the zone of the immediate contact with the parties' law-enforcement bodies, which in general deprives their activity of any kind of intelligible grounds. Making the above-mentioned declarations, not only does colonel Zverev mislead the audience, but also consistently and insistently interprets the documents in a way that is convenient for the Transnistrian party. What for?

Oddly enough, in order to prolong the peacemaking operation for infinity in this very format, under which Transnistria is a full party entitled to veto any of the JCC decisions, whereas the Russian Federation is just an observer-guarantor ready to agree with any joint decisions made by the representatives of Chisinau and Tiraspol, although for a long time there has been no such decisions and they are not likely to appear any time soon.

What is Really Happening?

Since 2001, the inhabitants of the villages of Gura-Bicului (right riverbank) and Bicioc (left riverbank) have been asking persistently to open for circulation the repaired bridge over the Nistru River. But they do not open it: I. Smirnov has his personal vision on that. The peacemaking points guarding this bridge have been ordered very strictly not to allow anyone cross it! And right it is, since the bridge is not opened officially. However, there are no rules without exceptions! Those who need to cross it do it. Among them are even high-ranking officers of the Russian Army Group (ORAG) to Moldova. They seem to need it more than a poor peasant who has to go around 40 or even 50 km. They may allow the peasants to cross the bridge, although on certain conditions... for a fee, apparently, to the fund of the peacemaking operation.

The inhabitants of the same-name villages of Delacau in Anenii-Noi and Grigoriopol rayons have been asking to open the ferry crossing for several years now. There is even the approval of the Joint Control Committee. But, since the Transnistrian offices have their own opinion - against - the ferry stays motionless. The peacemakers do respect the Transnistrian authorities indeed! At the end of 2004, the administration of Bender city addressed the Joint Control Committee with the request to allot several acres of land to "Sheriff" Company to build a petrol station on the territory of the military camp located at the city entrance, right opposite the bus station. Having listened to the insistent objections of the same Colonel Anatoly Zverev, senior military commander on behalf of the Russian Federation, the JCC rejected the request. However, sooner than six months later, the cars started roaring, the constructors bustling, the

fancied territory was fenced off and the beauty of a station was put up in a record time. Apparently, the local authorities had reached an agreement with the military officers. They also say that the highest-ranking Russian peacemaker, General *Valery Evnevich*, himself have been to the station inauguration. They are probably telling lies, aren't they?

In 2005, the Russian troops command announced that the boxes (located in the same military camp) used for parking the cars of the Moldovan and Ukrainian peacemaking contingent at all times were totally worn-out and about to collapse and, therefore, should be immediately demolished. The Moldovan outfit was dragged out by tractors in order not to get it crushed probably, without turning the motors on or waiting for the owners. And they immediately proceeded to demolition. But it did not turn out to be that quick, for, the boxes would have surely outlived more than one decade. For several weeks they were knocking them off by pneumatic chippers and cutting them off by acetylene welding outfits, accurately piling the floor slabs, building and foundation blocks, bricks removed by lifting cranes. For, the property was worth hundreds of thousands lei and could not be just left like that. And what about the cars driven outside, and the humiliation of the operation colleagues... this was indeed something nobody was interested in. By the way, about the property, i.e. about the demolished boxes, or rather about the construction materials they have been made of. People, including Russian peacemaking officers, whisper that they have not let it just to stay like that indeed. People gossip that some of the fathers-commanders use the "wrecking" bricks to build themselves villas somewhere between Bender and Tiraspol.

At the order of the ministry of the interior of the unrecognized PMR, the policemen at the Dubasari reservoir dam make their Moldovan colleagues to take off their uniform if they want to cross the river. And the peacemakers repeat understandingly that this is the MINISTER's order and it must be carried out. In this case as well, they have reached an agreement with the local authorities. Or a hearty war veteran carries a little bag with humanitarian cereals, and the same Transnistrian arms of the law at the dam tell him to pay the due. An official of Dubasari rayon goes with business from Ustye to Cosnita, and the Transnistrian migration officers tell her to pay 7.40 lei, as if she was crossing the dam to Spain and not going to a neighbouring village. As we have already mentioned, one of the duties of the permanent JPF check-points is to avoid destabilization of the situation in the Security Zone. And it can be destabilized only by the military forces that carry out tasks without having coordinated them with the JCC or JMC. So, within 14 years, the corresponding Chisinau structures have not created a single one of such situations.

However the Transnistrians do it permanently. Everybody remembers the Dorotkaia case and the situation with schools. In 2004, having illegally brought hundreds of armed military to Bender, Tiraspol expropriated the most important railway node. Peace was hanged by a thread. Should Moldovan policemen have crossed a certain limit when they were protecting a cameraman beaten by the police or the arrested station employees, who knows how it would have turned out in the end. An entire economic branch is paralyzed, people languish in poverty, but peacemakers keep insisting that they have not admitted any destabilization. We shall particularly underline that the aim pursued by the Transnistrian authorities opting for an open extremism has been reached. On April 21, 2006, without JCC sanction, Tiraspol brought around one hundred of military men to Varnita, thus, creating dangerous preconditions for unleashing an armed conflict. The goal of the action was to rob the "MoldEcoNistru Flot" enterprise that had employed many Bender inhabitants. Before the eyes of the entire military command, the Transnistrian military boldly stole the dredger and the barge, the mechanisms that provided the basis for the production process. And the Transnistrian administration easily reached its goal again. Tiraspol businessmen got rid of their competitors, received expensive technical equipment as a gift (the dredger is currently working hard extracting sand to the benefit of Tiraspol authorities). Around one hundred workers of the enterprise have not received their wages for months now. And what is very important is that, under the current conditions of carrying out the peacemaking operation, there are no chances to obtain justice, as the Transnistrian delegation to the JCC cannot act against the orders of their leaders.

The fact that this odd peacemaking operation has become an instrument of implementing the mercantile aspirations and pretensions of Tiraspol heads and supporting persons does not call any doubts with anybody anymore. What is very dangerous is that the massive use of Transnistrian military structures, which is the main potential detonator of an armed conflict, has become a usual thing. And under these extremely worrying circumstances, the representatives of the Russian Federation are insistently opposing to changing the format of the operation, creating mechanisms that would really guarantee peace and

stability. Why? Is it just about dividends that somebody could get from locating the petrol station on the territory of the military camp, from the stolen dredger, or from illegal crossing of the bridge? Although, there has been somebody dreaming of renting a meter of the state border ...

Joking aside, all this nightmare and absurdness means one thing: Tiraspol leaders, under the conditions of carrying out a "unique" peacemaking operation, do not allow the grass fill the trenches with an irresistible success. They cannot do otherwise. There is a danger, although a made-up one, so, there must be irreconcilable leaders and... peacemakers. They have come to an agreement on this one and mutually support each other. So far, that even the absurd plans of expanding the peacemaking contingent and returning the helicopter troop taken back home to Russia long ago to the aerodrome of Tiraspol find support, active fighters and people to see to the matter. Meanwhile, the tragedy of the separated and humiliated people does not bother anybody. --Semion Nikulin. www.azi.md/comment?ID=41285

8. Trans-Dniester: Longing for Russian Hug, Breakaway Region Feels the Pinch of Isolation. Worldstream. 29.09.2006

Mara D. Bellaby, AP Worldstream, Trans-Dniester - The Kvint Distillery with its smooth, wooden casks full of honey-colored brandy is so revered in Trans-Dniester that it graces the 5-ruble bank note But like this breakaway republic, it exists in isolation. The bottles chugging down the assembly line to be filled, corked, stamped and boxed for shipment once traveled easily around the Soviet Union and the rest of the Communist world. Not anymore. Lately they have faced barriers entering two of their biggest markets, Russia and Ukraine The parallels aren't lost on the 550,000 people of Trans-Dniester. The territory, having broken away from Moldova, is recognized by no one. Its passports, holdovers from when it was part of the Soviet Union, are useless

Its smugglers have saddled it with a reputation as an outlaw state, of potential use to terrorists. Foreign visitors are so rare that an American journalist visiting a school is besieged for autographs It has just voted overwhelmingly in a referendum to seek unification with Russia, but Russia doesn't seem eager to have it. Meanwhile, as Trans-Dniester looks east, Moldova, like neighboring Ukraine and nearby Romania, is looking west, to the democracies of the European Union Of all the broken pieces and sharp edges left by the breakup of the Soviet Union nearly 15 years ago, few are as unusual as this ragged ribbon of land, 125 miles (200 kilometers) long by 10 miles (16 kilometers) wide, wedged between the Dniester River and Ukraine The Soviet crackup gave birth to 15 new nations, but it also left millions of ethnic Russians in limbo, stranded in countries suddenly turned foreign and in many cases eager to shake off Moscow's heavy hand

In the Baltic states of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, ethnic Russians complain of discrimination against their language. In Ukraine, they are a powerful political force engaged in a constant tug-of-war with pro-Westerners The ex-Soviet republic of Georgia is carved up by two pro-Russian separatist regions. Kaliningrad is a Baltic Sea enclave of 1 million Russians, 350 miles (563 kilometers) from home soil and surrounded by EU countries Chechnya has been waging a separatist war for a decade Trans-Dniester, about twice the size of Luxembourg and comprising one-eighth of Moldova, has never stopped yearning for Russia's embrace. Its leader, *Igor Smirnov*, who has Russian citizenship, hails Russia as the natural home for his people Trans-Dniester declared itself independent as the Soviet Union began to show signs of crumbling fearing Moldova would seek to reunite with Romania

The Kremlin, while at odds with Moldova and sympathetic to the separatists, has reacted coolly to the idea of absorbing the impoverished territory, and says the two sides should negotiate a settlement So the Sept. 17 referendum which voted 97.1 percent yes to the government's goal of union with Russia is dismissed by political analyst *Viorel Cibotaru* of Moldova's Institute of Public Policy as a feel-good measure and nothing more "It's like a circus: you see something, but it's an illusion. Because the truth is, Trans-Dniester is an empty idea, it's going nowhere," he says. Not so, insists Smirnov. Trans-Dniester and Moldova simply have nothing uncommon, the president declared to his people after the vote. "We choose Russia, and they choose the European Union and NATO. All these 16 years, they have tried to impose on us an alien point of view ... but today, that's history. "History weighs heavy here. Once known as Bessarabia, the entire region has a rich ethnic mix, with parts of it falling under the Lithuanian, Czarist Russian, Romanian

and Soviet empires Today, the scrambled geopolitical jigsaw puzzle left by the Soviet collapses highlighted by the 109-year-old Kvint distillery in Trans-Dniester's capital, Tiraspol

Caught on a bureaucratic merry-go-round, its wines and cognacs are frozen out of Russia because the Kremlin considers them Moldovan, and has an embargo on Moldovan alcohol And they were frozen out of Ukraine for two years because they weren't considered Moldovan enough - the plant didn't have the right Moldovan business registration. Its export certificate is still only temporary Critics claim Trans-Dniester is a paradise for smugglers, bandits and traffickers in weapons and drugs. "The Trans-Dniester problem is reflecting negatively on the entire criminal situation in Moldova and Ukraine," Ukraine's interior minister, **Yuriy Lutsenko**, complained recently The EU has deployed border police of its member states to help stem the flow of contraband through the deserted, hilly roads that connect Trans-Dniester to Ukraine offers "10 things you didn't know about Europe's newest country," including that it has twice the population of Iceland, 35 national groups and a market economy It also claims to have made giant inroads into the smuggling problem, and quotes EU and other Western watchdogs as saying "there is no evidence that Pridnestrovie (Trans-Dniester) has ever trafficked arms or nuclear material." That's a reference to reports that circulated in 2004 claiming Trans-Dniester could be a marketplace for weapons of mass destruction leftover from when the Soviets had arms factories here

Smirnov, the president, has suggested that Trans-Dniester suffers in part because of his unconcealed nostalgia for the Soviet Union Trans-Dniester and Moldova both elect their presidents. But while Moldova is on a reformist, pro-Western course, Trans-Dniester keeps its Soviet habits and discipline The streets are largely empty, but everyone uses crosswalks and waits for the lights to change. Slogans endorsing Soviet-era solidarity and cooperation are freshly painted on walls and buildings After school, teenagers gather along the left bank of the Dniester River to strum guitars and talk about what they'll do when they get out - to Moscow, to Kiev, to Odessa, wherever. "Moscow is a big city and that's where the opportunities are," said Aleksandra Luchkova, 16, in fluent English The population has fallen 20 percent in 16 years; in 2004, 5,000 babies were born, down from 12,000 in 1992. The wait for Russian citizenship and a passport can be two years. Meanwhile, to get in and out requires passing through five separate checkpoints

For the referendum, **Dmitry Soin**, head of a state security committee, whipped up the youth vote to burn Moldovan flags and ride giant American tractors through Tiraspol's streets under banners of Che Guevara "We are waking up Trans-Dniester youth," said Soin, 37, sipping espresso in a dimly lit cafe. "I'm not going to say we don't have a problem with youth migration, but I don't think it's so unusual. Youth, the world over, are very mobile and dream of escaping to somewhere new.» The students set up a tent camp with the help of a pro-Kremlin youth group brought in from Russia. But on referendum day, the tents were empty and blown away by the wind Soin, who played a key role in 2004 efforts to close Moldovan-language schools in Trans-Dniester, doesn't leave the territory because he is wanted by Interpol for premeditated murder in connection with two killings in 1994 and 1995 while serving in the Trans-Dniester security service He says Moldova is pushing the charge as punishment for his independence efforts. Moldova accuses him of stirring ethnic hatred and creating paramilitary organizations

Analysts say it's hard to know what is really going on because so little is revealed and business deals are murky. A giant sports complex that reportedly cost around US\$200 million (A157 million) went up a few years ago on the outskirts of Tiraspol Its owner, the Sheriff company, also manages supermarkets and gas stations, and is one of the few businesses that are allowed to trade openly in dollars rather than in Trans-Dniester's weaker ruble currency The company is reportedly linked to Smirnov's family, an allegation the president and his entourage deny Smirnov is driven around in a humble Skoda, and generally, wealth is not flaunted in Trans-Dniester, where many residents survive on US\$50 (A39) a month, though officials insist the average salary is three times higher "There has been a big, and not unsuccessful, effort to keep people satisfied with their salaries and pensions," Cibotaru, the Moldovan analyst, said On a bright Sunday afternoon, people packed a main street pizza parlor, 7thDay, and streamed in and out of Mickey's, which advertises 16 types of hamburger toppings "It's not correct to say that life here is bleak," said Valentina Beslar, 45, as she waited for a trolley bus near a monument to fallen soldiers "But, of course, everyone dreams of better - and for us that means joining Russia, if they'll have us."

9. 'The Expansion Process Has Begun'. The Weekly Standard. 10.10.2006

"TRANSNISTRIA'S integration into Russia will proceed in several phases, and it may take 5 to 7 years," said the breakaway Moldovan region's foreign minister, *Valery Litskai*, to Russia's Interfax news agency earlier this month. "Russian society is now ready to expand beyond the . . . borders it has been forced into," he added. "The expansion process has begun.» About the only phrases missing from this sinister declaration were the German "we need Lebensraum" of the 1930s, or the "you will be assimilated» threat of the Borg, the fictional half-human/half-machine alien race of the TV-series Star Trek There are many ways of trying to enlarge one's national territory--or to reclaim territory lost through the dissolution of an empire The one tactic that has worked well in Europe's recent past is some version of the Sudetenland card used by the Third Reich to annex the German-speaking regions of Czechoslovakia. The playbook is simple enough

Agitate for the rights of a minority through PR campaigns led by a very vocal political movement within the territory's borders that has ties to (and surreptitious financing from) the nation seeking to annex the territory. This movement then engineers a "national" referendum calling for the territory to rejoin its motherland In the case of Russia's effort to assimilate the Transnistria region of the former Soviet Republic of Moldova, now an independent nation, the Kremlin has followed this well-worn script to the letter. On September 19, the slightly more than half-million residents of this region bordering Ukraine and Moldova (several hundred miles from the nearest Russian territory) voted to declare independence from Moldova with an eye towards an eventual union with Russia

Another third are ethnic Ukrainian, with the remainder a collection of Moldovan and other Balkan nationalities The legitimacy of this referendum was not recognized by the E.U. (or any other government), and has been denounced by the Moldovan government But in Moscow the vote was heralded as the first step of a multi-staged effort for Russian reacquisition of territories lost after the fall of the Soviet Union. Moscow continues to maintain a military force of some 1,300 personnel in Transnistria Transnistria is not the only place where Russia and its political bedfellows are seeking to destabilize an existing government in order to regain Moscow's imperial holdings Already there are plans in the works for similar referendums in the South Ossetia and Abkhazia regions of Georgia. Russia has been trying to fan the flames of nationalism in some areas neighboring Kazakhstan, where there are large Russian-speaking populations

Russian national sensitivities have chafed for decades over the fact that in 1954, Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev (who was Ukrainian by birth), moved the borders between the Russian and Ukrainian Soviet Republics, giving the Crimean peninsula to Ukraine to celebrate what he called at the time "300 years of pan-Slavic brotherhood.» Since the fall of the Soviet Union, calls for Crimea to be "returned" to Russia have never ceased. Their tempo increased after the election in early 2005 of a pro-Western president of Ukraine, *Viktor Yushchenko* Moscow has tried numerous ploys--including a threat this past January to cutoff all natural gas flows to Ukraine--to weaken Yushchenko's hold on power Not surprisingly, Viktor Yanukovich, head of Ukraine's pro-Russian Party of the Regions and now the prime minister, has used the issue of the Russian-speaking diaspora in Crimea to his own (as well as Moscow's) political purposes

During this spring's parliamentary elections, Yanukovich, who was Yushchenko's rival in the 2004 presidential race, promised to make Russian the official second language of Ukraine and to strengthen ties with Russia Not surprisingly, his first foreign trip after becoming prime minister again this August was the one hour and forty-minute flight to Moscow What most concerns leaders in Ukraine and other former Soviet republics is that efforts by Russia to subvert their governments are not limited to these public campaigns by local demagogues and visible strong-arm tactics like threatening to turn the gas off Russia, they say, is secretly planting operatives within the armed forces of these newly independent nations Government intelligence sources in the former Soviet republics bordering Russia have provided THE WEEKLY STANDARD a list of military officers from Transnistria who were issued false military service passports by the Russian Ministry of Defense

These documents, they say, fraudulently identify the officers as personnel of the 31482 Unit of the Operational Group of the Russian Army in the Transnistrian Region of the Moldova Republic Russian authorities then transport these personnel to be put through the elite Russian officer training courses called "Vystrel," conducted in the city of Solnechnogorsk at the Russian combined arms training center

According to the documents provided by these sources, 15 or more Transnistrian officers were trained there in 2005 and another 30 were to be trained by the end of 2006. The training program is two to four months in length, and produces officers for all command levels and areas of specialization

Military and intelligence sources in former Soviet republics with knowledge of this secret officer training program worry that this is a sign that Russia--now flush with oil wealth and intent on flexing its muscles in the international arena--is ratcheting up its efforts to intimidate, Finlandize, and otherwise assert control over the Russian-speaking areas of its former republics "You do not try to cover up a training program of this size unless you are someday planning on using these people to overthrow or otherwise take control of a sovereign government," said an intelligence officer in a former Soviet republic "The facility at Solnechnogorsk is used by Russia to train numerous on-Russian military personnel openly and legally for peacekeeping and other joint operations. If then, in parallel, you are training officers from these disputed regions--officers that are pretending to be Russian personnel and carrying bogus paperwork--then it does not take an enormous leap of faith to assume that Moscow is up to no good on this one.» Russia is well known for the outrageous behavior of its ultra-nationalist politicians, and the world therefore tends to dismiss threats of Russian expansionism as clownish. But there is nothing circus-like about secret military training. And there is no guarantee that Transnistria is the only region where it is taking place.

<https://weekllystandard.com/default.asp>

10. Молдавия Возвращается в Клуб Друзей России. Независимая Газета. 12.10.2006



Григорий Карасин наводит дипломатические мосты в Кишиневе После трех лет похолодания в отношениях Москвы и Кишинева вновь намечается потепление. Об этом «НГ» сообщил источник в МИД России, сославшись на визит в молдавскую столицу статс-секретаря, заместителя министра иностранных дел РФ **Григория Карасина**, который начался вчера. По словам источника, эта поездка состоялась после встречи во вторник в Москве министра иностранных дел Молдавии **Андрея Стратана** с главой российского внешнеполитического ведомства Сергеем Лавровым, на

которой посланец молдавского президента заверил российскую сторону в том, **что Кишинев – не Тбилиси и с ним Москва всегда сможет договориться по всем вопросам**. Посол Республики Молдова в РФ Василий Стурза подтвердил «НГ» этот посыл в той его части, где речь идет о возможных компромиссах.

Стурза подчеркнул, что молдавская сторона «полностью удовлетворена итогами переговоров министров иностранных дел двух стран, а также состоявшейся накануне поездкой в Кишинев министра образования и науки РФ, сопредседателя межправительственной российско-молдавской комиссии по экономическому сотрудничеству **Андрея Фурсенко**». По словам молдавского посла, «важен сам факт возобновившегося межгосударственного диалога, а также то, что обозначилась общая позиция по большинству обсуждаемых вопросов, а по спорным идет поиск точек соприкосновения». Источник «НГ» в МИД РФ посчитал показательным то, что в поездке Фурсенко по Молдавии сопровождал лично президент Владимир Воронин. Со своей стороны, лидер Демократической партии, председатель одноименной парламентской фракции **Дмитрий Дьяков** сказал «НГ», что восстановление отношений – добрый знак, ибо «ситуация, **когда Молдавия борется с Россией, а Россия на нее давит, бесперспективна**».

В сообщении же МИД РФ по поводу встречи **Сергея Лаврова** с его молдавским коллегой говорится: «Главы внешнеполитических ведомств обсудили меры по налаживанию конструктивного российско-молдавского диалога, импульс которому придала встреча президентов двух стран в августе этого года». Кишиневская пресса между тем задается вопросом: что пообещал Воронин в обмен на восстановление добрых отношений. Напомним, в 2003 году президент Молдавии отказался подписать предложенный Москвой план урегулирования приднестровского конфликта, известный как «план Козака». Президент РФ отменил тогда намеченный визит в молдавскую

столицу, а официальный Кишинев взял курс на ЕС и НАТО. **Нынешний разворот Воронина на 180 градусов и возвращение его в «московский клуб» некоторые молдавские эксперты трактуют как вынужденный шаг, продиктованный событиями в Грузии.** «Грузия сейчас – подопытное государство, которое показывает, что нас ждет в случае, если усилится великая политическая игра, в которой мы оказались более чем мелкой пешкой», – полагает кишиневская газета Saptamina. «Но, может, именно этот кавказский опыт приведет к определенной смене сил на международной политической арене, что смягчит потенциальные последствия противостояния?» – задается вопросом издание.

Грузинская тема не случайно присутствует в эти дни в местных СМИ – в ближайшие выходные в Кишиневе проведет свое заседание Парламентская ассамблея ГУАМ. И главной темой обсуждения на нем будет приднестровское урегулирование и выполнение РФ решений стамбульского саммита ОБСЕ (вывод войск из Приднестровья). Позиция Молдавии по обоим вопросам известна – немедленная эвакуация российских войск и миротворцев и решение проблемы Приднестровья на условиях Кишинева. Как сказал «НГ» редактор одного из оппозиционных молдавских изданий Артем Вареница, на этом мероприятии молдавские депутаты могут удивить своих коллег по ГУАМ, отказавшись от традиционной антироссийской риторики. Тем более что во время встречи Григория Карасина с Владимиром Ворониным вчера была достигнута договоренность о том, что 18 октября в Одессе возобновятся переговоры по приднестровскому урегулированию, которые были заморожены в марте, после того как Молдавия ввела экономические санкции против своего восточного региона. Россия, как известно, взяла Приднестровье под свою защиту. По мнению экспертов, после переговоров с Карасиным Воронин займет в ГУАМ нейтральную позицию в обмен на лояльность российского руководства. www.ng.ru/cis/2006-10-12/8_moldavia.html

11.Просьба о Признании. Strana.ru 12.10.2006

Верховный Совет Приднестровья принял в среду обращение к депутатам Госдумы России, Верховной рады Украины, Национального собрания Республики Беларусь и Парламентской ассамблеи стран СНГ с просьбой об инициировании процедуры признания Приднестровской Молдавской Республики (ПМР). Как заявила Стране.Ру начальник пресс-службы Верховного Совета Наталья Булат, соответствующее парламентское постановление направлено на реализацию волеизъявления местного населения, проголосовавшего на референдуме 17 сентября за независимость Приднестровья и возможность последующего его вхождения в состав России. В среду же замминистра иностранных дел России **Григорий Карасин**, находящийся с визитом в Молдавии, провел встречи с президентом Молдавии Владимиром Ворониным и вице-премьером Зинаидой Гречаной, а затем направился в Приднестровье. По словам Натальи Булат, рассмотрев вопрос 27 сентября, депутаты рекомендовали парламентской комиссии по внешней политике подготовить соответствующий проект обращения к коллегам из стран СНГ. Как пояснил Стране.Ру председатель названной комиссии **Сергей Чебан**, поскольку данное обращение принималось в виде парламентского постановления, то, по регламенту, могло быть утверждено в этот же день с внесенными по ходу обсуждения поправками.

Надо отметить, что ранее, в специальном заявлении, принятом в конце прошлой недели в пятницу, депутаты российской Госдумы отметили, что **«итоги референдума в Приднестровье должны быть в полной мере учтены международным сообществом ради обеспечения прав человека, мира и безопасности в данном регионе и справедливого разрешения приднестровского конфликта».** Они также высказали убеждение, что и Россия должна выстраивать свою политику с учетом свободного волеизъявления приднестровцев. В соответствии с собственными рекомендациями, по идее, Дума теперь должна воспринять и адресованное к ней обращение ВС с просьбой об инициировании процедуры признания ПМР. По крайней мере, так эта ситуация выглядит теоретически.

В среду, незадолго до того, как парламент Приднестровья принимал свое постановление, в Кишиневе находился с визитом замминистра иностранных дел РФ Григорий Карасин. Ему, судя по всему, **поручено «прощупать» позиции приднестровских и молдавских властей, чтобы определить направленность дальнейших практических шагов Москвы в приднестровском**

урегулировании. В среду в молдавской столице у него уже состоялись встречи с президентом Молдавии Владимиром Ворониным и вице-премьером Зинаидой Гречаной. Также здесь была достигнута договоренность о возобновлении регулярных консультаций внешнеполитических ведомств двух стран по важнейшим направлениям двустороннего сотрудничества. Запланированы у российского дипломата и встречи с приднестровскими руководителями и, в частности, с президентом ПМР Игорем Смирновым.

Напомним, на днях глава российской дипломатии Сергей Лавров вновь повторил: **в Москве приднестровский референдум воспринимают как «сигнал к тому, что нужно возвращаться за стол переговоров».** За возобновление переговоров высказался и министр иностранных дел ПМР **Валерий Лицкай**. Как он заметил журналистам, «переговоры - это лучше, чем смотреть друг на друга через прицел». И добавил: «Но сегодня главный вопрос - о чем говорить Кишиневу и Тирасполю сейчас, когда приднестровский референдум уже расставил все акценты? Закон для приднестровских дипломатов - это выбор избирателей, которые сказали «нет» общему дому с Молдавией».

Еще в начале октября в Страсбурге на встрече с председателем молдавского парламента Марианом Лупу генеральный секретарь Совета Европы **Тери Девис** заявил, что **СЕ поддерживает позицию официального Кишинева в приднестровском урегулировании.** И, по сообщению пресс-службы генсека СЕ, продолжил: «Когда бы вы ни нуждались в нашей помощи в процессе приднестровского урегулирования, просите о ней, не колеблясь». Как известно, позиция Кишинева в переговорном процессе базируется на принятом летом 2005 года молдавским парламентом законе об особом статусе Приднестровья, предусматривающем наделение ПМР усеченным автономным статусом, против которого Тирасполь выступал все последние годы. Теперь же позиция европейских структур меняется. Во вторник Валерий Лицкай сообщил, что получил от имени действующего председателя ОБСЕ, министра иностранных дел Бельгии Карела де Гюхта новые предложения по приднестровскому урегулированию, которые разработаны с учетом опыта Бельгии - страны с федеративным устройством. Как сообщил журналистам министр реинтеграции Республики Молдова **Василий Шова**, в Кишиневе также получили и теперь изучают эти предложения. Кстати, надо отметить, что эти предложения, судя по всему, в основном напоминают так называемый "план Козака", хотя их детали пока неизвестны.

В комментарии для Страны.Ru пресс-секретарь миссии ОБСЕ в Республике Молдова **Клаус Нейкирх** пояснил, что названные наработки не являются официальным документом ОБСЕ и были подготовлены бельгийским МИД в виде предложений для последующих консультаций. Как он сообщил, 17-18 октября в Одессе соберутся представители стран-посредников - России и Украины, а также наблюдателей от ЕС и США, которые обсудят нынешнюю ситуацию в приднестровском урегулировании. Ожидается также, что утром 18-го они встретятся здесь с министром реинтеграции Республики Молдова Василием Шовой и во второй половине дня - с Валерием Лицкаем. Как подчеркнул г-н Нейкирх, предполагаемые консультации в Одессе могут быть восприняты в качестве одного из первых шагов по возобновлению переговорного процесса.

www.strana.ru/stories/01/11/19/2043/295048.html

12. Приднестровье Готовится к Выборам. Strana.ru. 12.10.2006

Уже четыре кандидата уведомили Центральную избирательную комиссию самопровозглашенной Приднестровской Молдавской республики (ПМР) о намерении принять участие в предстоящих здесь 10 декабря президентских выборах. Об этом в среду сообщил Стране.Ru председатель приднестровского Центризбиркома **Петр Денисенко**. Как он уточнил, официальными участниками избирательной кампании ЦИК признает лишь тех претендентов, которые успешно пройдут установленную законом процедуру регистрации и предоставят в комиссию не менее двух процентов подписей от общего числа избирателей. Срок выдвижения кандидатов заканчивается 31 октября, а период сбора подписей продлится до 10 ноября. Таким образом, на сегодня зафиксированы четыре потенциальных кандидата на участие в президентской гонке. Это действующий президент ПМР Игорь Смирнов, депутат Верховного совета Петр Томайлы, редактор

партийного издания коммунистов «Правда Приднестровья» Надежда Бондаренко и ее коллега, редактор оппозиционной местной «Новой газеты», политолог Андрей Сафонов.

Открыл список претендентов **Игорь Смирнов**. Во второй половине сентября его выдвинули кандидатом в президенты трудовые коллективы Молдавского металлургического завода (одного из ведущих предприятий республики), Республиканской клинической больницы и Республиканского госпиталя инвалидов Великой отечественной войны. Далее за выдвижение его кандидатуры высказались коллективы двух известных тираспольских предприятий - ЗАО «Тиротекс» и «Электромаш», бендерского завода «Молдавкабель», а также расположенных в Бендерах гимназии N2, средних школ N15 и 18 и ряда местных лечебно-профилактических учреждений. Дружно поддержали идею выдвижения действующего президента и участники второго съезда Патриотической партии Приднестровья, которую возглавляет сын действующего главы республики - Олег Смирнов, а также члены Высшего совета общественно-политической организации «Республика», известной своим пропрезидентским настроением.

Как уточнил Петр Денисенко, официальными кандидатами в президенты упомянутые претенденты будут признаны лишь по завершению установленной законом процедуры регистрации и при наличии собранных в их поддержку не менее 2 процентов подписей от общего числа избирателей республики (394 861 человек). В соответствии с Избирательным кодексом ПМР, кандидаты могут быть выдвинуты на основе самовыдвижения, а также инициативными группами, политическими партиями и общественными организациями, объединениями и блоками, а также трудовыми коллективами численностью более десяти человек. По словам главы ЦИК, представители его организации бдительно следят за тем, чтобы при выдвижении кандидатов не допускались нарушения законодательных норм, и в связи с этим оказывают им самим и их сторонникам необходимую консультативную помощь. По закону срок выдвижения кандидатов должен завершиться 31 октября, а сбор подписей продолжится до 10 ноября. Решения же Центризбиркома об официальной регистрации выдвиженцев в качестве кандидатов в президенты ПМР могут приниматься вплоть до 9 декабря.

Как заметил в комментарии для Страны.Ru председатель комитета Верховного Совета ПМР по госбезопасности, обороне и миротворческой деятельности **Олег Гудымо**, из заявленной четверки претендентов реальными шансами на победу в предстоящих выборах обладает только действующий президент. «За годы управления Приднестровьем Игорь Смирнов накопил необходимый опыт, который поможет ему и в нынешней непростой ситуации выполнить поставленные перед главой ПМР новые задачи, в частности по реализации выраженного на референдуме 17 сентября волеизъявления приднестровцев, подавляющее большинство которых проголосовало за продолжение независимого курса республики и сохранение «восточного вектора» в ее внешней политике», - констатировал г-н Гудымо. По его словам, другие претенденты не способны составить серьезную конкуренцию Игорю Смирнову. Не будучи публичными политиками, они мало известны приднестровской общественности.

«Что же касается политолога Андрея Сафонова, то он за последние годы прослыл человеком, который пытался осуществить здесь чужую внешнюю волю, зачастую противоречившую интересам Приднестровской Республики. Не секрет, что его активно поддерживали различные международные структуры и в частности миссия ОБСЕ в Республике Молдова. Всемирную помощь, очевидно, западные спонсоры окажут Сафонову и в президентской кампании, но это не обеспечит ему успеха», - заключил глава комитета ВС.В Кишиневе, к слову, некоторые наблюдатели уже отметили парадоксальность факта участия в приднестровских выборах кандидата, пользующегося очевидной поддержкой западных структур, которые, между прочим, не устают заявлять о непризнании как самой ПМР, так и предстоящих здесь очередных президентских выборов. Сам Андрей Сафонов в комментарии для Страны.Ru пояснил, что никогда не ставил под сомнение приднестровскую государственность, работал на руководящих должностях в ПМР и потому считает правомерным свое участие в президентской кампании. Как и всякий кандидат, он намерен добиваться победы. Хотя, по словам г-на Сафонова, местные силовые структуры в подконтрольных СМИ уже организовали публикацию материалов с необоснованными выпадами в его адрес. Распространенные сообщения о том, что он, якобы, получает гранты от западных структур, редактор «Новой газеты» назвал «намеренной дезинформацией».

Но, так или иначе, появление связанной с его именем сюжетной линии создает дополнительную интригу в начавшейся избирательной кампании. По-прежнему интересует публику и вопрос о возможном участии в выборах Евгения Шевчука, председателя Верховного совета ПМР, лидера партии «Обновление», получившей на прошлогодних выборах большинство голосов в приднестровском парламенте. Поддерживаемый мощной бизнес-структурой «Шериф», приднестровский спикер, по идее, мог бы стать сильным конкурентом для действующего президента. Впрочем, пока Евгений Шевчук воздерживается от ответа на вопрос о своем участии в предстоящих выборах. Как он пояснил в недавнем интервью Стране.Ru, у него еще есть время для того, чтобы определиться с решением по данному поводу. В связи с этим его конкурент Андрей Сафонов ранее заявил Стране.Ru, что проведение референдума поспособствовало укреплению позиций Игоря Смирнова. В свою очередь, известный приднестровский политик Григорий Маракуца, прежде возглавлявший Верховный совет, а ныне являющийся специальным представителем ВС по межпарламентским связям, предположил, что «обновленцы», удовлетворившись победой на парламентских выборах, не будут штурмовать сейчас и президентскую «вершину», поскольку пока к этому не готовы. www.strana.ru/print/294315.html

13. Виталий Кулик: «Украину вытеснили из Приднестровья». Iamik.ru 11.10.2006

Мы уже писали о результатах референдума в Приднестровье. 97% проголосовавших жителей этого региона подтвердили свой выбор в пользу государственной независимости с последующим свободным присоединением к России. Сразу после референдума президент непризнанной Приднестровской молдавской республики Игорь Смирнов провозгласил курс на синхронизацию законодательства и системы власти республики с российскими аналогами. 2006 г.), но и политическая реформа. Чего ждать в краткосрочной перспективе Украине от этого региона? Каково будущее урегулирования замороженного конфликта на Днестре? На эти вопросы мы попросили ответить недавно вернувшегося из Приднестровья директора Центра исследований проблем гражданского общества Виталия Кулика.

- В Приднестровье состоится политическая реформа. В чем ее суть и насколько она может демократизировать регион?

- По сути, Приднестровье является суперпрезидентской республикой. Полномочия главы государства значительны даже по сравнению с РФ. Но в Тирасполе прекрасно понимают, что необходимо меняться. Поэтому президент Смирнов инициировал политическую реформу, целью которой является переход от кризисного штаба по управлению непризнанным гособразованием к полноценному государственному аппарату. Это часть политики России, направленной на стабилизацию непризнанных режимов, приведение к власти подконтрольных менеджерских команд, способных защитить интересы Москвы от посягательств третьих сторон. Но, несмотря на создание полноценного Кабмина с премьер-министром во главе, конституционный проект оставляет президенту право отправить его в отставку, а также распустить Верховный Совет. Т.е. Приднестровье останется президентской республикой. А сам Игорь Смирнов, вероятней всего, снова будет избран президентом ПМР. По мнению специалистов, после выборов состоится зачистка административного аппарата от чрезмерно привязанных к местному бизнесу элементов. Новому старому президенту нужны будут только проверенные кадры.

Но в самой ПМР есть силы, понимающие, что у Приднестровья нет границы с Россией. И как точно подметил депутат Госдумы РФ Дмитрий Рогозин, без учета интересов Украины у Приднестровья нет никаких политических шансов. Для того чтобы вести эффективный диалог с Западом, легитимизироваться, необходима реальная демократизация режима. То, что предлагает Смирнов, к такой легитимизации не приведет. Шансом для Приднестровья решить конфликт с максимальным учетом собственных интересов является усиление роли представительных органов власти и наделение их большими полномочиями, в частности, в принятии важных решений на местах.

- Что изменилось в Приднестровье после референдума и как это повлияет на Украину?

- Пока нет оснований утверждать, что результаты референдума будут иметь немедленные политические последствия. Его результаты официально не признаны Россией, Украиной, странами ЕС, а также другими международными структурами. Однако сам по себе референдум оказался знаковым для переговорного процесса вокруг урегулирования приднестровского конфликта. То, что эксперты назвали ловушками «косовизации», проявилось уже на прошлой неделе. Так, Тирасполь четко заявил, что не желает вести переговоры с Кишиневом о реинтеграции.

В свою очередь, президент РМ Владимир Воронин указал, что «переговоры о Приднестровском урегулировании должны базироваться на положениях закона о статусе Приднестровского региона от 22 июня 2005 г.», где речь идет об автономии, похожей на наш крымский аналог. Естественно, что при таких условиях ни о каком продуктивном диалоге речь идти не может. Украинский план Ющенко об урегулировании Приднестровского конфликта через демократизацию и демилитаризацию фактически можно отправлять в дипломатический архив. Вторым важным фактором, который имеет к Украине прямое отношение, является мощное усиление России в регионе.

- В чем это проявляется?

- Во всех сферах жизни Приднестровья. Главным образом, в экономике. Правительство Российской Федерации приняло программу оказания помощи Приднестровью. Речь идет не только о более чем 50 миллионах долларов, которые русские дали Тирасполю на поддержку бюджетной и пенсионной сферы, но и о так называемом «специальном кредите» для помощи приднестровским предприятиям (\$150 миллионов). Все это называется «комплексной помощью» РФ Приднестровью. Естественно, что эти средства не отдаются ПМР бесплатно, за них придется платить. И платить, скорее всего, государственным имуществом. По информации российской «Независимой газеты», в «залоговый список» могут попасть машиностроительные, электротехнические и оборонные предприятия. Российский капитал уже присутствует на Молдавском металлургическом заводе (ММЗ) (инвестором является «Уральская сталь»), россиянами также куплены винзавод «Букет Молдавии», Бендерский шелковый комбинат, обувная фабрика «Флоаре», завод «Прибор» и др.

Для того, чтобы обеспечить эти интересы, после политической реформы и введения должности премьер-министра ПМР россияне, скорее всего, попробуют поставить своего человека во главе приднестровского Кабмина. Тем более, что подобные прецеденты «обкатаны», например, в Абхазии и Южной Осетии, где высшими должностными лицами непризнанных республик становились российские чиновники.

- А как же Украина?

- А Украина оказывается в роли статиста. И, к сожалению, уже не в первый раз. Официальная Молдова заявила, что не признает результатов приватизации в ПМР. Наши дипломаты и политики, опасаясь окриков из Брюсселя, боялись обострить отношения с Кишиневом, тогда как российские фирмы скупали собственность ПМР. Киев долго боялся проявлять активность в экономической жизни Приднестровья. И, в результате, РФ фактически заканчивает оформление своего экономического доминирования в этом регионе. Мы потеряли не только вероятную экономическую выгоду, но и упустили инициативу в процессе урегулирования в Приднестровье. В то время, как РФ шаг за шагом закрепляла свое влияние в политической (из десятка новосозданных партий 2/3 четко subordinированы под интересы России) и экономической сферах Приднестровья, Украина решала за свой счет внутренние проблемы Молдовы. Мы закрыли приднестровскую железную дорогу, установили ограничения для внешнеэкономической деятельности приднестровских экономических агентов и пр. Поэтому 97% голосов за Россию на приднестровском референдуме — это четкая оценка политики Киева в Приднестровье!

- Сможет ли Украина вернуться в Приднестровье?

- А мы пока оттуда и не уходили. Этнических украинцев там около 200 тысяч и 70 тысяч граждан Украины. Приднестровье и Украину связывают не только наши соотечественники, но общая граница, культурное пространство. Тысячи приднестровцев работают или учатся в Украине. Ни для кого не секрет, что украинские компании заинтересованы в приднестровском рынке. На него завязаны некоторые крупные отечественные финансово-политические группы. Есть и готовность приднестровского руководства идти нам навстречу. Но для того, чтобы Киев смог активизироваться

в Приднестровье, необходима политическая воля руководства страны. Вопрос состоит в способности Киева играть свою собственную игру. Без оглядки на Запад или Восток. --Сергей Савченко. www.iamik.ru/?op=full&what=content&ident=30236

14.Сепаратизм в Молдове: Мнения Экспертов. Iamik.ru 05.10.2006

Недавно в Приднестровье состоялся референдум, в ходе которого большинство его участников проголосовали за независимость от Молдовы. Тем не менее ни одна страна мира не признала результаты этого плебисцита легитимными. О причинах происшедшего размышляют американские эксперты — участники конференции на тему «Сепаратизм в Молдове», проходившей в вашингтонском Центре Международных исследований имени Вудро Вильсона. Как считает *Кристофер Борген*, профессор международного права нью-йоркского университета Сент-Джон, для того, чтобы какой-то регион мог претендовать на отделение, там должно проживать этнически однородное население, и не должно быть сомнений, что там уважаются права человека. Сепаратистам также следует доказать, что все возможности решения проблемы переговорным путем исчерпаны.

По мнению профессора Боргена, претензии Приднестровья на независимость не отвечают международному праву: «Право на самоопределение никоим образом не следует отождествлять с каким-то общим правом на отделение. Самоопределение не равняется отделению, а касается скорее возможности развивать свою культуру, отправлять свою веру и иметь возможность влиять на политику государства». Не признанная в мире Приднестровская республика провозгласила свое создание в сентябре 1990. В качестве местной валюты там имеет хождение рубль, сохранилась также символика советских времен. Власти Приднестровья отказываются вести переговоры с Кишиневом и признавать молдавские законы. На протяжении шестнадцати лет сохранять этот статус помогают российская армия, имеющая на территории Приднестровья военную базу. Российские войска находятся там без согласия правительства Молдовы. Москва, заявляя о поддержке территориальной целостности Молдовы, обещала вывести оттуда свой военный контингент, однако своего обещания пока так и не выполнила.

Бывший представитель ОБСЕ в Молдове Уильям Хилл считает неконструктивной политику России в отношении территориальной проблемы Молдовы. «Ответственность за срыв решения конфликта следует возложить на Россию», — полагает он. По словам сотрудника государственного департамента Дэвида Крамера, США стремятся найти такое решение конфликта, которое будет учитывать целостность территории Молдовы. Необходимо возобновить переговоры, считает он, и добавляет, что хотя Молдова является одной из самых бедных стран Европы, она может многое сделать для того, чтобы стать привлекательной для населения Приднестровья: «Это означает, что надо приступить к энергичным реформам в сфере экономики, искать новые рынки, поощрять зарубежные инвестиции. Следует также укреплять верховенство закона, обеспечивать соблюдение прав человека и повышать уровень жизни». -- *Ивана Кухар*. www.iamik.ru/?op=full&what=content&ident=30225

15.Хорошего Понемногу. Vremea.net 11.10.2006

Уже вторая неделя проходит в Молдове под девизом улучшения экономических отношений с «большим северным братом». В прошлую пятницу здесь прошла встреча сопредседателей молдавско-российской межправительственной комиссии по торгово-экономическому сотрудничеству, после которой был подписан совместный протокол, ставший, по словам участников, «первым реальным шагом в улучшении отношений за несколько лет» Первый вице-премьер РМ Зинаида Гречаная назвала этот протокол документом, в котором нет «цветных пятен». Ее коллега, министр образования и науки РФ Андрей Фурсенко в свою очередь высказал мнение: «Сегодня в наших экономических отношениях нет вопросов, по которым мы бы занимали противоположные позиции». В выходные российская делегация пробовала молдавское вино. Говорят, им понравилось. Пестицидов и тяжелых металлов на вкус не почувствовали.

Так или иначе, Молдова обещала бороться с подделками, и соответствующий план будет подготовлен уже к ноябрю, когда пройдет первое с 2003 года заседание молдавско-российской межправительственной комиссии. Договоренность, вроде, достигнута и по подписанию долгосрочного (на 5 лет) контракта по поставкам газа. Правда, данные о цене пока противоречивые, но, в конце концов, о какой цене идет речь при пятилетнем контракте? Речь может идти только о ее формуле. Политикой поехал в Москву заниматься министр иностранных дел и европейской интеграции Андрей Стратан. Там он встретился со своим российским коллегой Сергеем Лавровым. К нам, в свою очередь, заниматься приднестровским урегулированием приехал вчера поздно вечером статс-секретарь, замминистра иностранных дел РФ Григорий Карасин. Здесь он встретится с высшим руководством страны, чтобы потом выехать в Левобережье и провести встречи там.

Поездка Карасина с самого начала напомнила «челночную дипломатию» Дмитрия Козака. В своем интервью российскому изданию «Время Новостей» российский дипломат довольно по-МИДовски разъяснил, зачем едет и о чем будет в Молдове говорить. По его мнению, «референдум в Приднестровье - важный политический индикатор, призванный вернуть Приднестровье и Молдавию на путь переговоров. Политическими методами проблему приднестровского урегулирования решить можно, санкциями же - нет. Сейчас это хорошо понимает и украинская сторона, и во все возрастающей степени понимает молдавская сторона».

Говоря о возможных новых «меморандумах Козака», российский дипломат уклончиво отметил, что «вариантов много». «Главное, не зарываясь в детали, сохранить базовый принцип - сделать документы, приемлемые для обеих сторон в конфликте. Надеемся, что после убедительных результатов прошедшего плебисцита возвращение Приднестровья в переговорный процесс не будет сопряжено с искусственными осложнениями. Мы же настроены всячески способствовать возобновлению переговоров. У нас продолжаются контакты с Приднестровьем, посредниками от Украины и ОБСЕ, появились новые возможности и для результативности от контактов с молдавской стороной, никогда не прекращавшихся. Эта тема станет одной из важнейших составляющих и моей поездки в Молдавию», - заявил Григорий Карасин. Тем временем, действующий председатель ОБСЕ Карел де Гухт выступил вчера со своим пакетом предложений по приднестровскому урегулированию (возможно, именно это Карасин назвал «новой возможностью для результативности»). Министр иностранных дел т.н. ПМР Валерий Лицкай поспешил растражировать свое заявление по поводу этого пакета предложений. В частности, Лицкай обрадовалось то, что предложения совершенно не соответствуют закрепленному в «плане Ющенко» и законах молдавского парламента принципу предоставления приднестровскому региону автономии в рамках объединенного государства.

Как стало известно «Времени», в Кишиневе не собираются даже рассматривать этот пакет предложений, считая их «меморандумом Козака-2». В предложениях де Гухта снова фигурирует «федерализация», о которой он говорил еще в начале года, только приступив к исполнению мандата. Тогда в Кишиневе решили: наверное, не разобрался в ситуации, да и бельгиец, понятное дело, действует на основе опыта своей страны. Сейчас понятно, что это было не простой ошибкой. По нашей информации, именно этот «пакет поправок» едет в Молдову «продвигать» Карасин. О перспективах такого занятия можно рассказать словами министра реинтеграции Молдовы Василия Шовы. В разговоре с корреспондентом «Времени» он заявил: «Ничего об этих предложениях не знаю, а если и знаю, то забыл, потому что не запоминаю подобных вещей».

www.vreamea.net/news/2006-10-11/13:54:08.htm

16.Григорий Карасин: «Референдум Придал Больше Уверенности Населению и Лидерам Приднестровья в том, что Они На Правильном Пути». Ольвия-Пресс. 11.10.2006

Итоги референдума 17 сентября подтвердили, что население Приднестровья поддерживает курс, проводимый Президентом ПМР Игорем Смирновым. Об этом заявил сегодня в Тирасполе заместитель министра иностранных дел России *Григорий Карасин*. В приднестровской столице российская делегация во главе с Григорием Карасиным провела переговоры с Президентом Приднестровья. Во встрече приняли также участие представители Кабинета министров ПМР.

Участники встречи обсудили вопросы двусторонних российско-приднестровских отношений, а также возможности возобновления переговорного процесса по урегулированию отношений между Молдовой и Приднестровьем. Отвечая на вопросы журналистов, Григорий Карасин подтвердил, что итоги референдума 17 сентября – это факт политической жизни, с которым придется считаться всем.

«Итоги референдума – это вотум доверия народа своим руководителям, – сказал заместитель министра иностранных дел России. – Это чрезвычайно важно и этот факт нельзя игнорировать при любых политических раскладах, связанных с Приднестровьем, в будущем. Референдум придал больше уверенности населению и лидерам Приднестровья в том, что они на правильном пути». Журналисты интересовались, какие конкретные шаги намерена принимать Москва в вопросе об интеграции Приднестровья в российское пространство. «Речь идет о практической работе, – сказал Григорий Карасин. – У нас есть целый ряд совместных договоренностей в области экономики, социальной сферы, образования. Мы обсудили сегодня пути практической реализации этих договоренностей». Глава российской делегации сообщил также, что на следующей неделе в Одессе пройдут консультации в формате «5+1». Такой формат означает, что в течение двух дней посредники и наблюдатели обсудят по отдельности с представителями Кишинева и Тирасполя возможность возобновления переговорного процесса. «Мы обсуждали этот вопрос и в Кишиневе, и наша основная мысль – без прямых контактов между Кишиневом и Тирасполем, без выработки таких документов, которые были бы приемлемы Молдове и Приднестровью, речь об успехе урегулирования идти не может», – заявил Григорий Карасин.

Российский дипломат сообщил также, что значительное время на встрече в Тирасполе стороны уделили обсуждению транзитного протокола – документа, который призван обеспечить право Приднестровья на свободную внешнеэкономическую деятельность. «Мы исходим из понимания того, что это очень важный документ, – заявил заместитель министра иностранных дел России. – Мы обменялись мнениями о том, каким образом надо продвигать его к реализации. Выполнение этой задачи зависит не только от Приднестровья и России, но и от других стран. И я убежден, что транзитный протокол станет одним из важных вопросов обсуждения на предстоящей встрече в Одессе».

Как отметил Президент ПМР Игорь Смирнов, без подписания этого документа невозможно возобновление полноценного переговорного процесса. «Не могут быть переговоры без гарантии того, что давление на одну из сторон переговоров впредь невозможно», – сказал глава государства. По его словам, должны быть исключены любые возможности повторения ситуации, подобных той, когда Молдова «использовала внутривнутриполитические события в Украине», чтобы с помощью экономических мер склонить Тирасполь к политической капитуляции. Игорь Смирнов выразил признательность России за ту помощь и поддержку, которую Москва оказала Приднестровью в самые тяжелые дни блокады. По словам Президента, руководству Молдовы пора понять, что только те политические договоренности могут быть успешны, которые учитывают мнение и Кишинева, и Тирасполя. «Пока же на протяжении последних лет Молдова показывает свою недоговороспособность», – отметил глава государства. Говоря о результатах референдума, Игорь Смирнов вновь подтвердил, что выбор населения – это ориентир для официального Тирасполя. «Воля народа – это интеграция с Россией во всех сферах жизни, и мы будем ее выполнять», – сказал Президент ПМР. www.olvia.idknet.com/ol68-10-06.htm